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Abstract 
The paper critically discusses the widespread literature focusing on informal 
post-communist “clans,” “networks,” or “fiefdoms.” Often self-described as 
determinedly empirical, the “clan” paradigm is crucially shaped by its origins in 
the analysis of East Asia, as well as by its use as an ideal-typical opposite of 
Western-style hands-off market contracting in the “markets and hierarchies” 
literature.  
To counter such deficiencies, the paper proposes an alternative argument. 
Although interactions are indeed personalized, interpersonal trust in many 
post-communist countries has failed to compensate for missing institutional 
safeguards. Rather, confronted with an environment of low trust and high 
uncertainty, actors have developed two main coping strategies: on the one 
hand vertical integration, on the other hand a hedging strategy of purposeful 
network redundancy. Even though trust and enforcement remain low, actors 
can minimize the consequences of default by maintaining multiple ties.  
The consequences of such organizational strategies are ambiguous. By 
compensating for defaults, network redundancy has cushioned the impact of 
economic crisis. At the same time, network redundancy has considerably raised 
overall transaction costs and may also play a role in impeding democratic 
consolidation. 
Keywords 
Transition, networks, social capital, trust, Russia. 
5 
Transacting in the Absence of Trust  
Uncertainty and network patterns in post-communism 
1 Introduction 
“In Russia, business deals, founding of companies, investment decisions or cooperation are not 
done within the framework of official and formal institutions or structures; rather, this is done 
with the help of friends, relatives, or colleagues. In the face of the often unstable norms and 
principles of the transformation period and of wide-spread corruption, this means that the factor 
‘trust’ has a special significance, which can be reduced to the formula: a lack of system trust is 
compensated by taking recourse to private relationships and networks, i.e., a reliance on 
traditional forms of (inter)personal trust. … By now, these networks can even be understood to 
be a stable and relatively closed system of relationships between business partners.” 
Hans-Hermann Höhmann and Elena Malieva, 2002 
 
“all these various forms of networks involve intricate and durable relations which are based on 
trust and reciprocal patterns of communication and exchange”  
Gernot Grabher, characterising previous studies on networks in transition economies (Grabher 
1993, p. xiii). 
 
 “Headquarters [for Hewlett-Packard] continually kept pushing the idea that we should 
establish a single distributor and work only with him. They didn’t understand that you can’t do 
that in Russia ... Periodically a new conqueror flies in from the West, and he is convinced that 
we have to search for a ‘focused’ distributor, who will sell everything, and HP will develop him. 
Well, a maximum of two ‘focused’ distributors. And we Russians have to convince them again 
and again: Gentlemen, this is Russia, you can’t do that here… [Instead, in the beginning] we 
were recruiting five or six vendors each month. We even had a joke about it: in the Russian 
office there’s no day without a [new] vendor.” 
Boris Shcherbakov , former head of PC Division, Hewlett Packard Russia, 1997 
 
Prevailing accounts of post-socialist networks – as the above quotes show - 
have overwhelmingly painted a picture of dense, normatively based networks 
relying on a high degree of interpersonal trust. Yet as the last quote shows, this 
image may not always correspond to reality. However counterintuitive to many 
observers aware of the importance of “connections” for getting things done, 
survey after survey has shown not just low levels of trust in instructions, but 
equally low levels of interpersonal or reciprocal trust (Radaev 2003, p. 8-9; 
Gibson 2001). As one scholar of Russian business pointedly summarized, 
Russian entrepreneurs “can trust only their mothers or daughters, not even 
their sons,” in his view explaining why the local business press strongly advises 
not to involve extended family members such as cousins or sons-in-law in 
management functions (Igor’ Gurkov, Carnegie Mellon lecture at UC Berkeley, 
November 12, 1998.) 
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This poses not one, but two puzzles to answer. Given low levels of 
interpersonal trust, what has led so many experts to argue the opposite? And 
on the empirical level, how does an economy or society function in a climate 
of prevailing distrust of both institutions and personal contacts? 
This paper attempts to give an answer to both of these puzzles. As it 
argues, network or “clan” arguments arose as a response to early transition 
studies which expected a unidirectional development towards convergence 
with Western patterns, overlooking the highly personalised and informal 
character  of post-communist states and societies. In contrast to this, “clan” 
and also “fiefdom” views of post-communist society took the empiricist high 
ground, claiming for themselves to be more attuned to the informal realities 
and  legacies of the past. However, timely and important as the network 
argument was, it actually brought in a cognitive bias of its own. This bias had 
several sources, stemming on the one hand from the sources of the network 
and clan literature in the study of East Asian economies and on  the other 
hand, in the ideal-typical contrasting of markets, hierarchies and clans in the 
context of transaction cost economics and the governance of industries debate.  
Recognition of this bias makes it necessary to come to a new 
interpretation of post-communist reality, taking seriously both the 
informalization and particularisation of society and the fact that this takes place 
in an environment of overwhelming distrust.  
Under these circumstances, as this article suggests, rather than converging 
into “clans”, relationship patterns will be dominated by strategies of risk 
avoidance and risk-spreading. This, I hypothesize, takes two main forms. 
Particularistic relationships can be hedged through the multiplication, rather 
than tightening, of such ties. Secondly, actors buffer against their high-risk, 
low-trust environment by broadening their direct hierarchical control – in 
other words, achieve a degree of autarchy through vertical integration. This 
could mean vertical integration in industry, but also the construction of 
regional political fiefs. Another, alternative way of buffering is to bypass 
domestic markets as much as possible by transacting only with partners 
abroad. 
The paper is structured in the following way: Section 2 sets out the “clan” 
paradigm described above and traces its sources. Section 3 looks to the 
theoretical literature on social and economic networks for alternative ways of 
conceptualising relationships, while section 4 takes a second look at the 
socialist past and the role personal networks played in overcoming uncertainty 
both in relationships between economic actors and on the other hand with 
regard to citizens’ everyday survival strategies. Section 5 applies these 
arguments to the reality of transition economies, and asks whether there are 
any discernible trends for consolidation. 
7 
2 Transition or Transformation? Universalistic vs. 
particularistic views of  post-communist society 
In the immediate aftermath of the Soviet collapse, popular as well as academic 
expectations were dominated by conventional unidirectional views of 
westernising transition familiar from early modernisation theory. There were 
two main types of “transition” scenarios: one of them the classical market 
transition based on profit-maximizing atomistic actors, an alternative model in 
contrast stressing group bargaining and the virtues of “civil society,” both of 
them relying heavily on universalistic institutions. Network, clan and 
“feudalism” approaches were developed in explicit opposition against such 
views of transition; they emphasized organisational legacies, institutional 
particularise and direct interpersonal ties. 
 
Market Transition Theory. Soviet-style economies had failed because they 
had replaced markets with bureaucratic coordination. For market liberals, the 
depoliticisation of economic life, applying equally to ownership, allocation, 
credit and prices, accordingly became the main yardstick for measuring the 
progress of post-communist transition (Aslund 1995, p. 3-4; Boycko et al. 1995, 
p. 10-11).  In their eyes, depoliticisation was a simple process, largely akin to 
Western efforts at deregulation. There were two important components to this 
view of markets. First of all, the market mechanism was seen as intrinsically 
impersonal and universalistic. Secondly, markets were viewed in a primordial 
fashion, as based on natural entrepreneurial inclinations that needed only to be 
unleashed. Neoliberals anticipated little problems with the implementation of 
laissez-faire policies; ironically given their general distrust of government, 
administrative fiat was seen as an effective way of achieving deregulation: 
Thus, Anders Aslund refers to a 1993 Council of Ministers Decree prohibiting 
subsidized credits as proof positive that “(c)redit and pricing have thus been 
essentially ... depoliticized” (Aslund 1995, p. 4). 
 
Group-based transition. This view of transition focuses on developments 
within society and its relations with the state. Individual actors in this view do 
not act in an atomized fashion, as in the market model; rather, political and 
economic outcomes result from pressure by and/or consensual bargaining 
between more or less organized corporate or group actors. This process can be 
evaluated in two very different ways - positively as “civil society” or negatively 
as “rent-seeking coalitions”. Both versions, though, refer to substantively the 
same developments.1 
 
                                                
1 While much of the literature focuses exclusively on formal interest groups, others 
have questioned the importance of formal organization. Function, in their view, 
supersedes form: after all, looser structures and informal coalitions may also work 
towards the same collective goals. 
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The common prerequisite for the interest group and market atomistic 
model is a functioning state. This is because both of them in different ways 
rely on the existence and universal application of impersonal procedures that 
create public goods – either for the benefit of all society or of groups within 
society. 
Market transition at a minimum requires the state to fulfil classical night-
watchman functions - the definition and enforcement of property rights, 
accounting standards, basic transparency and the like.2 Many transition 
theorists also went far beyond this to advocate, for example, transferring 
Russian enterprises’ welfare functions to governmental organs in order to 
increase mobility of labour (Layard & Richter 1995, p. 138-141). What this 
effectively meant was building a Western-style welfare state, based on similar 
institutions, at any rate not the patriarchal enterprise welfare model 
characteristic of state socialism. Thus contrary to their own claims, market 
reformers were not so much trying to roll back the state, but rather to build a 
different state – one that, ironically, would need more rather than less 
administrative capacity in order to function properly (Chaudhry 1993; 
Tompson 1997).  
Similarly, the interest group approach was based on a state strong enough 
to commit to and provide agreed-upon benefits to members of a given class or 
group regardless of individual characteristics. After all, if automatic, 
universalistic application of benefits cannot be relied on, political and econo-
mic action immediately shifts from the collective arena to an individual one. 
Actors may still push for collective rules, but they will concentrate on having 
these rules applied in their own cases, rather than across the board for the 
group as a whole. 
Few transition analysts seriously questioned the ability of the Russian state 
to provide basic public goods. Its real failings, to be sure, were too massive to 
overlook completely; however, they were played down and attributed to a lack 
of political will or the still-ongoing nature of the transition process, rather than 
to fundamental institutional deficiencies. Since problems were viewed as 
transitional, they were also expected to disappear over time. The neoliberal 
reformers expected shock therapy to unleash enough energy to create an 
independent momentum towards institutional consolidation. Newly 
created/legalized owners, so they argued, would generate widespread demand 
for a rules-based system. One of the key architects of the Russian privatization 
program, Maksim Boycko, triumphantly declared in 1995: “We believe that a 
genuine demand for [legal] reforms now exists, primarily because privatized 
and newly private firms need legal protection and commercial laws to 
                                                
2 This true of all but a few extreme libertarians. Vitalii Naishul, for example, in a 1994 
article advocates a Hayek-style “free banking” system, coupled with the abolition of 
compulsory taxation. He does, however, retain the state’s monopoly on violence. 
(Naishul 1994, p. 180-181)3 From the 1970s on, scholars began to challenge this view 
in favor of the input of broader societal and elite groups into political decisions. 
However, the two approaches mainly differed on how they envisaged the decision-
making process; neither of them much concerned itself with the implementation of 
those decisions. 
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restructure. We strongly disagree with the critics of privatization, who argue 
that legal reform had to precede privatization, since a year ago the political 
demand for legal reform simply did not exist. At this point in the Russian 
economic reform, in contrast, legal reform is both essential and feasible” 
(Boycko & Shleifer 1995, p. 105). In consequence of those beliefs, early 
neoliberal statements devoted little attention to the institutional underpinnings 
of a market economy. Their attitude to the state was aimed at its roll-back, 
rather than reconstruction. While Western transition theorists such as Anders 
Aslund did talk about “state-building”, this was conceptualized as an entirely 
separate agenda referring solely to the setting up of democratic institutions 
rather than the unrelated task of market reform (Aslund 1995, p. 7). Legal 
reform, in turn, for Aslund constituted yet another important but unrelated 
issue. Neoliberals’ efforts in this area centered on the drafting and approval of 
key economic legislation, rather than on a reform of legal institutions 
themselves. Legal reform thus was seen as a software problem rather than a 
fundamental institutional issue. As to the implementation of newly-passed 
legislation, this again was seen mainly as a matter of political will.  
This confidence was rooted in two factors. There was, for a start, simple 
ethnocentricity. Based on their own everyday experience, many Western 
scholars took public goods and the actual implementation of existing laws for 
granted or else expected them to emerge naturally once private property had 
been re-established. (Anders Aslund’s assumption that a single Council of 
Ministers’ decree against subsidized credits would miraculously eliminate soft 
budget constraints nicely demonstrates this attitude.) And while their post-
communist colleagues could have contradicted such views from direct 
experience, all too often they instead adopted established Western textbook 
models, no matter how unsuitable.  
This natural bias was reinforced because it was so much in accord with the 
traditional view of the USSR as a strong state. Classical totalitarianism 
theory, of course, painted a picture of absolute political control from above 
over an atomized population.3 This corresponded with the early Soviet self-
image: an ultra-modernist utopia functioning with machine-like, absolute 
quality. Ironically, it is exactly such “machine” metaphors that abound in the 
totalitarianism literature. After the end of Stalinism, this image was not 
discarded, but merely modified in such images as “bureaucracy writ large”, 
“USSR Inc.” (see, for example, Meyer 1965). However, as numerous studies 
have documented, this misinterprets Soviet experience. A strong state in terms 
of unchallenged political control is very different from a strong state in terms 
of administrative performance; the two may even be mutually exclusive. In 
reality, the very logic of totalitarian rule brought with it a trade-off between 
power and performance. Procedural rationality might enhance performance, 
but it also sets boundaries to the rulers themselves.  
                                                
3 From the 1970s on, scholars began to challenge this view in favor of the input of 
broader societal and elite groups into political decisions. However, the two approaches 
mainly differed on how they envisaged the decision-making process; neither of them 
much concerned itself with the implementation of those decisions. 
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The Soviet regime opted for a different solution. Concentration of power 
at the top was assured by a divide-and-rule strategy that blurred and multiplied 
lines of authority, while cyclical mobilization campaigns were designed to 
smash through bureaucratic resistance. The trade-off of this strategy was a 
weak state – at least as far as performance goes. This was true even of the 
classical Stalinist period” (Rittersporn 1982; see also Filtzer 1986; Lewin 1973; 
Remington 1984; Zaleski 1971; Zaleski et al. 1980).  
With the end of Stalinist coercion and the increasing complexity of Soviet 
industrial society, such problems multiplied. By the late 1970s, Soviet-style 
systems were in decay. Individual interests had hijacked the old coercive 
apparatus and turned it to their own, particularistic purposes (Walder 1986; 
Jowitt 1992b; Hankiss 1990; DiFranceisco & Gitelman 1984). Marc Garcelon 
nicely summarizes “the great ironic paradox of sustained Party-state rule: the 
subordination of particular interests and the individual’s life course to the 
diktat of ‘total administration’ resulted … in the pervasiveness of particularistic 
orientations and the near obliteration of civic orientations. The tangled web of 
particularism that marked the social world of Soviet-type society was the 
unintended consequence of the communist ideological project of ‘community 
without participation,’ of the total subordination of society to ‘the vanguard’ 
without intermediate, autonomous form of association or mechanisms of 
social integration beyond formulaic exhortations, coercion, and material 
incentives” (Garcelon 1997, p. 332). 
As seen above, market impersonalism as well as strong-state concepts 
founder on Russia’s procedural deficits. Evidently the post-Soviet political 
economy rests largely on sets of particularistic relationships; the challenge, 
then, is how to conceptualize these relationships. A broad-based literature 
devoted to particularistic ties in communist regimes from China to Eastern 
Europe had first emerged in the early 1980s. At the time, this literature was not 
discussed much beyond a small circle of area specialists and certainly did not 
play into the design of transition strategies. By the late 1990s, however, 
growing disillusionment had superseded the initial exalted expectations towards 
the transition project. Terms such as “crony capitalism” became common 
parlance – in particular after the 1998 economic crisis. Consequently, studies 
devoted to particularistic relationships in post-communist countries have 
become both more prominent and more numerous. Their predominant theme 
has been that of informal networks, clans, and cliques. 
There is, by now, a multitude of studies, many of them with their own 
idiosyncratic terminology (see for example Kharkhordin 1994; Wedel 1998; 
Stark & Bruszt 1998; Rigby 1998). Not all of them attempt to formulate an 
elaborate theoretical framework. But many of the most explicit and thought-
through studies do grow out of a common motivation: that of constructing a 
counter-project to totalitarianism theory. As Andrew Walder argued in his 
famous study of “communist neotraditionalism,” “instead of the totalitarian 
image of impersonal mobilization and social atomization, the neo-traditional 
image stresses a formally organized particularism in the distribution of goods, 
income, and career opportunities, a network of patron-client relations 
maintained by the party, and a rich subculture of instrumental-personal ties 
independent of the party's control” (Walder 1986, p. 7). Janine Wedel, 
discussing the impact of the Polish sociologist Stefan Nowak, makes the same 
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point even more forcefully when she argues that “Nowak’s theory [of the 
social vacuum] conceives of postwar Poland as an ‘atomized’ society, its 
mediating institutions destroyed by war and imposed revolution.” However, 
“the Nowak model overlooks the fact that Polish society has long been 
organized by a complex system of informal relationships involving such forms 
as personalized patron-client contacts, lateral networks, and ‘social circles’” 
(Wedel 1992, p. 9-12); see also Grabher & Stark 1997, p. 10). In this view, thus, 
the notion of informal, personalistic networks is merged with that of bona fide 
intermediary institutions.  
As to the concrete forms networks take, here again there is basic 
agreement. Several attempts have been made to synthesize the literature. As 
Gernot Grabher comments, heterogeneous though previous studies may be, 
“all these various forms of networks involve intricate and durable relations 
which are based on trust and reciprocal patterns of communication and 
exchange” (Grabher 1993, p. xiii). Janine Wedel equally sweepingly argues of 
existing studies that “all these groups - - Romanian unruly coalitions, 
Hungarian restructuring networks, Polish social circles, and Russian suzerainties 
and clans – may best be characterized as ‘cliques’”. Following Boissevain, she 
defines this term to refer to “dense and multiplex networks whose members 
have a common identity” (Wedel 1998, p. 6-7). 
We are thus not talking about networks in general, but about a very 
specific type of networks. For the sake of brevity, the following discussion will 
often refer to this particular type as ‘clans’. There is no set terminology to 
characterize different kinds of networks. The term “clan,” in particular, is used 
in very different meaning by different scholars. My own usage is derived from 
the way it has been applied by a number of scholars in the field of post-
communist studies ( – see, in particular, Wedel 1998). The distinction of “clan” 
and “fief” as, respectively, horizontal and vertical, or “diffuse” and 
“undiffuse”, is shared by Boisot & Child (1996), esp. p. 622. There are, of 
course, other usages of the word “clan”, for example in Ouchi (1996). 
 
Clans’ most important characteristics are the following: 
• Density and multiplexity, referring to “the degree to which the members 
of a person’s network are in touch with each other independently of him” 
(Boissevain 1974, p. 37) and the extent to which relations within the net-
work encompass several different social roles simultaneously.  
• Clans also adhere to a principle of exclusivity in selecting partners. This is 
held to substitute for the hands-off transactions found in more impersonal 
market structures.  
• Clans are stable over time. Even in the post-communist context, thus, So-
viet-era ties are preserved, either in their entirety or partially through a 
tightening of networks.4  
                                                
4The former is suggested by Jacques Sapir (1996, p. 67-69). A tightening of networks 
(without, however, taking in any new partners) is suggested by Gerber and 
Kharkhordin (1994).  
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• Finally, the enforcement mechanism operates on a normative basis, with 
shared values and interpersonal trust compensating for institutional defi-
cits.  
 
This conception of “networks” is, of course, not restricted to the field of post-
communist studies. Clientelism studies focusing on Africa highlight a similar 
set of attributes. Thus, Christopher Clapham (1982, p. 5-6) counts among the 
“characteristic features of clientelism”: “regularity and persistence of the 
exchange relationship”, incorporation “in a set of social networks and values 
which tend both to reinforce and to disguise the transactional nature of the 
relationship” and finally multiplexity  - “the relationship tends to become more 
complex and multifunctional…” The same is true of organization theory at 
large. In a 1989 article, Bradach and Eccles summarize the traditional view by 
saying that “the norms of obligation and cooperation highlighted in these 
studies all imply the existence of some sort of community of shared values, whether 
they reside in a network of business relations (Macauley 1963), a country (Dore 
1983), a geographically bounded industrial district (Sabel &Zeitlin 1985), or a 
firm (Ouchi 1980.” (Bradach & Eccles 1989, p. 107); emphasis added ). Even 
studies that do not explicitly define the term “network” often tacitly share the 
same assumptions. 
This near-unanimity is all the more surprising considering that classic 
accounts of particularized systems explicitly list a large variety of possible 
network relations, some close, some loose (Boissevain 1974; Landé 1977). 
Indeed the term “network” itself is often taken to refer to nothing more than 
social relations in general. In practice, however, very often a close reading will 
discover a conceptual jump from this general understanding of networks to 
dense, multiplex, and normatively based “clans”.  
 
Why is this the case, and what makes the “clan” concept so tempting to 
scholars? There are three distinct reasons for this. 
• First of all, “clan” concepts in the social sciences have historically been 
closely connected with a very specific comparative context. For this reason 
alone, certain aspects of networks are given prominence over others. 
• Secondly, black-and-white dichotomies such as the one described above 
neatly fit the abstract nature of such concepts as hierarchies and networks: 
much more neatly, at any rate, than the messy real world of hybrids, frag-
mentation, and multiple strategies. 
• Thirdly, claims about informal enforcement mechanisms are based largely 
on functionalist considerations. They thus neglect investigating actually ex-
isting resources and capacities.  
 
Beginning with the comparative context, it must be noted that conceptual 
rethinking both in communist studies and within the broader field of 
organization theory was inspired by a very concrete, regionally-based example: 
that of East Asia, and within East Asia, both of China and of the capitalist tiger 
economies. As Almond and Roselle (1990, p. 93-95) argue, much of the 
discipline’s recent preoccupation with informal relationships such as 
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clientelism and “clans” was mediated through studies of Communist China  
On the other hand, theory-building in organization theory, and in particular in 
the context of the markets and hierarchies debate, was driven by interest in the 
Japanese and overseas Chinese business networks. In consequence, both 
strands of scholarship referred to specific factors held to be characteristic of 
the East Asian situation, such as the Confucian ethic, the importance of 
personal reputation and “face”, and also - especially in studies of overseas 
Chinese networks - strong ethnic ties (see, for example, Redding 1990). This 
has led to a predominantly normative and cultural, rather than interest-driven 
view of networks. Trust and cohesiveness, rather than mutual resource 
dependence came to occupy the centre of attention. The new literature in post-
communist political economy builds on both of these research traditions and 
has inherited their normative focus. Thus, David Stark explicitly uses the term 
“clan” to refer to “the cohesive networks of trust, cross-ownership, and stable 
subcontracting that made possible the Japanese miracle” (Stark & Bruszt 1998, 
p. 69). 
While the East Asian comparative context explains much of the normative 
bias common to post-communist network theories, there are other factors as 
well. Important among those is the abstract, ideal-typical character of the 
network concept, which is often derived from other concepts (such as market 
impersonalism) as their negative residual. If “markets” are defined by one 
specific set of attributes, “networks” or “clans” in consequence tend to be 
allocated the opposing set of attributes. Thus, network relations are described 
in dichotomic fashion as informal, rather than formal, hands-on rather than 
hands-off, restricted and exclusive, rather than interchangeable and so on 
down the list.5 While the East Asia comparison had merely fostered a 
preoccupation with trust, values, and cohesiveness, the ideal typical approach 
goes far beyond that by turning “networks” and “trust” into near-synonyms. In 
a striking example of this approach, Bradach and Eccles assert that “the 
control mechanisms, price, authority, and trust … map roughly on to market, 
hierarchy, and relational contracting.”6  
The influence of Weber has also fostered thinking in such contrasts. The 
Weberian, or “neo-traditionalist” version of the network-market dichotomy 
has been especially influential in post-communist studies (Jowitt 1992a; Walder 
                                                
5Other dichotomic contrasts that are often included in this kind of argument are 
atomism vs. embeddedness; modern vs. traditional; universalistic vs. particularistic; 
hands-off market impersonalism vs. relational contracting. All of these tend to be 
associated with other traits on the same side of the equation. Thus, multiple network 
partners are seen in conjunction with hands-off relationships and enforcement 
through outside, universalistic institutions. In contrast , ties with single partners are 
associated with a hands-on, value-based character of the relationship. A good example 
of this approach is Mari Sako’s study on inter-firm relationships in Britain and Japan. 
(Sako 1992), esp. p.11). 
6 Bradach & Eccles 1989, p. 101. While they also assert that such control mechanisms 
take on various mixed forms in real life, still the ideal type itself firmly associates 
networks with the concept of trust - and that generates the kind if interpretations I 
have described earlier. 
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1986). Constructed as a conscious antithesis to Western “modernity”, this 
approach often juxtaposes every ideal-typical component of modernity with its 
“traditionalist” counterpart. This makes it hard to conceive of different 
combinations of “traditional” and “modern” elements. As Stinchcombe and 
Heimer argue about a similar type of contrast, contract and hierarchy, the 
“common danger of the ideal type method used in this literature is that one of 
the types, usually the most interesting one, is defined residually, by contrast 
with an empty ideal type into which very few empirical observations fall. This 
means not only that intermediate cases are misanalyzed, but that even the poles 
of contract and hierarchy are poorly defined” (Stinchcombe & Heimer 1985, p. 
126-127). The best students of neo-traditionalism have been well aware of 
these pitfalls, and carefully frame their definitions around them. However, that 
does not diminish the power of the original images. Especially lesser-rate, 
derivative studies have found it hard to escape their lure.  
Finally, as this article argues,  “network” proponents fall victim to a false 
functionalist logic. Post-communist society, they rightly argue, lacks 
institutionalized sources of trust. Because of the inadequate legal and 
bureaucratic structures, impersonal contract enforcement only works to a very 
limited extent. In response – thus the argument – economic actors compensate 
by building up direct interpersonal mechanisms of trust.7 
This implicitly assumes that the level of contract enforcement is constant 
across societies and across time, and that the only variation is in the respective 
mechanisms used to achieve compliance. In this way, the existence of strong 
enforcement mechanisms is inferred as a functional requirement. And since the 
most obvious such mechanisms in an under-institutionalised society are strong 
shared values and reputation effects, it is also inferred that the necessary level 
of trust either already exists, or can be achieved easily and within a limited time 
frame. This logical jump is further encouraged by the way enterprise surveys 
are constructed. Studies often instruct respondents to indicate their preferred, 
legal or extra-legal, enforcement mechanism. To exit relationships (and hence, 
to forego enforcement) is not a strategy provided for in such questionnaires.8 
But as Carlsson, Lundgren and Olsson (1999:13) found during investigations in 
Tomsk, especially private “firms often have a straightforward way of dealing 
with broken agreements; [rather than litigate] they simply do not continue 
doing business with firms that do not pay.”  
The functionalist argument asserts that personal, primordial forms of trust 
will simply emerge when needed. That is a highly problematic assumption. 
First of all, even in traditional settings societies may have very different levels 
of trust to begin with. Edward Banfield’s concept of ‘amoral familism’ is 
perhaps the best-known example of this (Banfield 1967). But trust becomes 
                                                
7 This argument is not unique to the post-communist context; for other references see 
Podolny 1994, p. 459; Geertz 1978; Whitley 1996, p. 52. 
8An exception is the excellent study by Hendley et al. (2000). Even here, however, exit 
is mainly considered as a threat, rather than as a realistic option – possibly because 
relationships are considered on a dyadic, buyer-to-supplier basis, rather than as a web 
of relationships in its entirety.  
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even more complicated as we move from traditional rural to industrial society. 
Revealingly, many of the “clan” examples described in the literature at large 
involve “bonding” social capital (Schuller 2007, p. 14) derived from traditional 
social formations like extended kinship and ethnic groups. As such, the 
concept is hard to apply to a heavily urbanized society like Russia’s. A few 
notable exceptions – like the Chechen mafia – merely confirm the rule. 
Generally, a majority of scholars sees industrial society as disruptive of 
primordial (or in the words of Lynne Zucker, “characteristic-based”) social 
trust. Migration and other disruptions have destroyed traditional social 
cohesion. Institutionalized forms of trust (the state bureaucracy, professional 
organizations, and financial intermediaries) come in to fill the vacuum precisely 
because social trust is so hard to reconstitute once destroyed (Zucker 1986, p. 
54). The directionality of this mainstream argument is the opposite of that 
assumed in the functionalist theory of networks. 
3 Alternative views of  networks 
As discussed, many network studies instinctively applies a certain, “clan”-like 
understanding to the subject. However, there have been exceptions from the 
start, and as network studies begin to focus more specific topics such as the 
sharing of information there are signs that the discussion as a whole is turning 
from dense and bonding forms of network capital to looser and bridging 
connections. Rethinking has focused on two points in particular: one, the 
(normative or otherwise) foundations of networks, and secondly, the trade-off 
between different forms of network characteristics depending on task and 
environmental characteristics. 
The normative foundations of  networks are not only being questioned in 
the post-communist case. Indeed, very similar criticism has been addressed to 
the even more entrenched view of East Asian countries as uniquely trust-based 
political economies. As Michael Gerlach (1992, p. 50-51) summarizes 
scholarship on Japan, “the ubiquity of trust as a cultural characteristic of 
Japanese society is by no means universally accepted.” In fact, he argues, many 
observers may simply be confusing an image propagated by protagonists  with 
reality: “Certainly Japanese managers tend to explain business behaviour in 
relational rather than instrumental terms, with words like ‘trust’ and ‘loyalty’ 
appearing repeatedly in accounts of the Japanese company and inter-company 
cooperation” – implying that such forms of self-characterisation do not have 
to be accepted at face value. 
As a consequence, newer empirical studies of both business and personal 
networks have gradually moved towards an alternative view that de-emphasizes 
qualities such as density and cohesion. As I shall argue, this modified view is 
much more suitable to post-communist political economies than the static 
interpretation of classical network theory.  
Such a view of networks becomes even more plausible if interests, not 
values, are seen as the driving force. The “clan” paradigm notwithstanding, 
such interest-driven definitions of networks have a broad basis in the literature 
on organizations. Thus, Hakansson and Johanson (1993, p. 45)explicitly define 
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networks as based on interests and contrast them to the normatively based 
principles of hierarchy and culture (see table 1).  
TABLE 1 
  
External force is based on Internal force is based on 
 Interests Norms 
Specific relations 1. Network 2. Hierarchy 
General relations 3. Market 4. Culture, profession 
Source: Source: Hakansson and Johanson (1993, p. 45) 
Other authors combine both norms and interests in their definition of 
“networks. ” The scheme employed by Campbell, Hollingsworth and Lindberg  
(1991) includes both norms and mutual dependency as crucial elements of 
network governance.  Building on this idea, later writings of J. Rogers 
Hollingsworth (2000) actually suggest differentiating between interest-based 
networks and values-based “communities” and “clans.”  Noteboom (2000, p. 
63) echoes such arguments when he notes that trust can be composed of many 
different components. Among the sources he names are “coercion, incentives 
from self-interest, ethics and norms/values, and habituation and bonds of  
kinship or friendship. These can be located either in the environment at large 
or in specific institutional arrangements.”  
A rough classification of these different elements would begin by dividing 
them into interest-based and norm-based mechanisms. Thus, Grandori and 
Soda (1995, p. 198) distinguish between “social norms and identification in the 
case of non-calculative trust, or reputation and social control in the case of 
calculative trust.”  Of the two, interest-based mechanisms rely more on 
repeated interaction, while norm-based mechanisms rely on long-term patterns 
embedded in the environment. The two of course shade into the other, 
reputation in the long run can create values as it acquires more of a taken-for-
granted quality. Evgenii Kuznetsov (1997) gives a interesting description of 
how investments in relationships can lead to the establishment of networks 
and network trust. A similar point is made by Grandori and Soda (1995, p. 
194) who contend that the process of information exchange itself over time 
can become a self-sustaining mechanism.  
Besides the normative foundations, network theorists have also devoted 
increasing attention to the trade-off between different forms of networks 
depending on task and environmental characteristics, in particular in highly 
fluid or knowledge-intensive settings. As Gargiulo and Benassi (2000) aptly 
characterise the discussion, “scholars typically highlight the enhancing effects 
of social networks on the ability of individuals and organizations to attain their 
goals. Yet, a cursory inspection of the literature reveals two different views of 
how social networks produce such benefits. On the one hand, the traditional 
view of social capital stresses the positive effects of “network closure”—i.e., 
the presence of cohesive ties—in promoting a normative environment that 
facilitates trust and cooperation between actors (Coleman 1988, 1990). On the 
other hand, structural hole theory (Burt 1992, 1997) argues that the benefits 
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from social capital stem from the brokerage opportunities created by disperse 
ties—that is, by the lack of network closure.” Such “disperse ties” – focused on 
range rather than depth - have been attracting increasing research attention 
over the past decade and are seen to be beneficial in a variety of circumstances: 
“Instead of getting “locked” or “trapped” into a single relationship, investing 
in range will allow an individual to adjust his or her network time across more 
or less rewarding knowledge transfer opportunities (Burt, 2008).” (Tortoriello 
et al. 2011, p. 29; see similarly Reagans & McEvily 2003) 
One important effect, thus, has been to redirect attention from traditional 
close and exclusive ties to looser and more flexible connections – something 
that can be useful for the analysis of post-communist societies. 
4 Alternative views of  networks and particularistic 
relationships in Soviet history 
“Clan” arguments explicitly refer to the communist legacy – sometimes, 
especially during the first decade of transition, by asserting a direct continuity 
of specific networks, but with increasing temporal distance focusing more on 
general relationship patterns. It is therefore worth taking another look at 
communist-era political economy and its interpretation. 
As already outlined in section 2, the predominant image of the strong and 
authoritarian communist state was focused primarily on its coercive capacities, 
neglecting the manifold problems in inter-organisational coherence and 
performance. It is possible to speak of a trade-off:  increasing political control 
and coercion actually contributed to decreased institutional integrity and hence, 
helped foster informal coping mechanisms. The famous Soviet economic 
planning mechanism is a case in point. As Moshe Lewin (1973) convincingly 
laid out in his classical article on “The Disappearance of Planning in the Plan”, 
overambitious economic development plans brought about their own undoing. 
Because unrealistic goals set by the Stalinist leadership could not be achieved, 
economic actors ended up having to make choices between various goals and 
recipients specified in planning documents – thus unwittingly unravelling the 
binding character of central planning. Eugene Zaleski’s (1980; 1971) magisterial 
and detailed study of Stalinist five year plans confirmed these conclusions. As 
he argues (1980, p. 502), “(t)he upshot of the preceding discussion is that 
economic policy, as expressed in the plans, is not implemented, The five-year 
plans are not actually put into operation, and the annual and quarterly plan – 
poorly coordinated, late, and put into operation piece-meal – represent only 
one of the elements of a whole network of decisions taken by the government 
during the year.”. As a result, actual allocation decisions were taken on a case-
by-case basis often reflecting political sectoral priorities, such as the precedence 
of producer goods and freight over agriculture and consumer goods (Zaleski et 
al. 1980, p. 504). The multitude of adjustments meant that “central planning” 
camouflaged the actual reality of the “centrally managed” economy (Zaleski et 
al. 1980, p. 484); as Michael Ellman (Ellman 1989) memorably put it, five-year 
plans in particular became essentially a “rationality ritual” designed to aid 
political mobilisation. 
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Economic actors did not fail to adjust to the realities of what Janos Kornai 
(1992) memorably characterised as the “shortage economy”. Early on, Joseph 
Berliner’s famous 1957 study “Factory and manager in the USSR” (Berliner 
1957) laid out the various informal strategies enterprise directors employed in 
order to cope with the supply uncertainties inbuilt in the system. As he argued 
here and in previous studies,  “(m)any of the important decisions which affect 
the firm are made not on the basis of ‘arm's length’ negotiation involving more 
or less objective parameters or universally applied criteria but on the basis of 
personal influence and cloakroom bargaining. The firm's output plan depends 
to a large extent upon what the plant officials have been able to bargain out of 
‘Moscow,’ the supply plan hinges upon how much can be haggled out of the 
functionary in the State Planning Commission, and the financial plan is based 
upon currying the favor of a minor official in the Commissariat of Finance” 
(Berliner 1952, p. 363). There were also numerous horizontal mechanisms to 
obtain necessary supplies, such as through the use of personalised directors’ 
networks and the hiring of professional “pushers” (tolkachi). 
Berliner’s studies have had tremendous influence on the conception of 
informal economic networks adopted by contemporary “clan” theorists. Thus, 
as Natalia Dinello (2002, p. 596) argues, “social networks provided a crucial 
mechanism through which the first and second economies were integrated... 
Characterized by inflexible political hierarchies, the communist deficit 
economies produced a demand for informal intermediaries or “go-getters” to 
sustain economic activities. Wherever money did not work as an effective 
medium of exchange, the “go-getters” searched for a deal or a trade through 
personal connections according to the principle ‘favor for favor, commodity 
for commodity.’”  
There is no doubt of the importance and lasting significance of the 
phenomena described by Berliner and his successors. However, it is less clear 
whether either his own view or the underlying Soviet reality ever corresponded 
to the contemporary interpretation of close and exclusive “clan” type 
networks. This can be ascertained with a simple logical exercise: The very 
nature of shortages, after all, was that they could not be anticipated. Problems 
emerged without warning and in ever new and unexpected locations. This also 
meant that there were few routinised remedies – even of a networking kind. 
Friends and acquaintances certainly did assist in mitigating shortages, but only 
as stations and conduits in an ever-improvised search. This was true on the 
personal as well as on the enterprise level. Stephen Fortescue has suggested 
that “the personalist relationships which were struck under the bargained 
economy … were based essentially on ‘spot market’ promises of mutual 
benefit” (Fortescue 1997, p. 10).  
Secondly, the centrality of deep interpersonal trust within directors’ circles 
is undercut by a second phenomenon profoundly characteristic of the Soviet-
era economies: hoarding and vertical integration. The use of vertical integration 
to reduce uncertainty is a common concept in organization theory (Pfeffer & 
Salancik 1978; Chandler 1977).  
Faced with endemic shortages, Soviet economic actors – both enterprises 
and ministries – similarly strove to reduce their dependence on the outside 
world by moving as much as possible towards internal transactions. Given an 
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insensitivity to cost, enterprise managers responded to (real or potential) labour 
shortages in Stalinist times by hiring over the required level - in effect hoarding 
labour – and in doing so often assisted potential employees in circumventing 
the draconian Stalin-era labour legislation (Filtzer 1986). The same was true of 
raw materials and services. As Janos Kornai (1992, p. 249) described the typical 
strategy, “(b)uyers make up for the absence of mobilizable producer reserve 
capacity by themselves producing the inputs they lack, if need be, This occurs 
even in the household in the form of handyman, do-it-yourself activity, and is 
thoroughly typical of the producer firms in classical socialism, whose high 
degree of vertical integration is largely explained by the shortage syndrome. 
Wherever possible an engineering works makes its own components and has 
its own foundry, and even its own building department, because it does not 
believe any outside firm will deliver a part or a casting or provide a 
construction service on time or in an orderly way.” At the ministerial level, 
vertical integration translated into empire-building. As the famous Russian 
sociologist Tatiana Zaslavskaia told a British scholar: “‘When I was in 
Novosibirsk, the minister of the Ministry of Medium-Machine Building Slavsky 
came … It was interesting just to listen to him. He never mentioned ‘in our 
ministry’; he just said ‘mine’. The identification was personal. ‘I have 330 state 
farms, my cows give 6,000 litres of milk, so my milk maids…’ etc. And another 
interesting thing he said was—‘By volume of production, my ministry is 
between the Ukraine and Kazakhstan.’ That’s third in the USSR. He’s an 
emperor. This is an empire. Now suppose we tell him he is supposed to look 
after scientific and technical policy and he shouldn’t pay the wages of milk 
maids.” (Whitefield 1993, p. 102). 
 The alternative and more utilitarian view of networks laid out in this and 
the preceding section is not only applicable to relations between firm-level 
actors, but has increasingly been applied to direct interpersonal relationships as 
well. The alleged value orientation of networks is more and more in the 
spotlight; thus, anthropological research on Soviet patronage mechanisms – for 
example Alena Ledeneva’s extensive study of blat relationships – remains 
cautious in assessing value orientation. While the use of blat, or connections,  
for personal benefit may have been ubiquitous, it was nonetheless vaguely 
frowned upon in public perception. In order to avoid this stigma, as Ledeneva 
suggests, many respondents may have disguised interest-driven network 
relationships in the cloak of friendship (Ledeneva 1998).9 
                                                
9 This form of bias may also have influenced the literature on post-communist inter-
enterprise ties. Surveys - such as the large-scale enterprise study undertaken by Boeva 
et al. in 1992 – did suggest that company directors placed great emphasis on traditions 
of mutual assistance. This conclusion, however, relied entirely on participants’ self-
evaluation. Indeed, as Oleg (Kharkhordin 1994, p. 407))has suggested, interviewers for 
the Boeva report may themselves have created the phenomenon they purported to 
analyze: “Interviews conducted by the authors of the Boeva report during the March 
1992 Congress of the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs seem to have 
been instrumental in transforming the hypothesis of the corporate ethic into virtual 
reality.”   
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Aside from value orientations, even research on Chinese networks, which 
often have been described as much more value-driven than their Soviet and 
post-Sovoet counterparts, upon closer examination reveals organisational 
patterns very different from those envisaged by the “clan” paradigm. Thus, 
even Mayfair Mei-hui Yang’s (Yang 1994, p. 125-126) well-known study on 
“Gifts, Favors, and Banquets”  argues that since guangxi transactions are 
frequently conducted through long chains of mediators, connections which in 
principle operate on the basis of familiarity may “also come to rely indirectly 
on the assistance of strangers.” Yang describes this as “achieved familiarity” 
under which “the art of guanxi [connections] is not restricted to ascribed 
relationships”. She concludes that “This flexible and enabling aspect of the art 
of guanxi must be recognized in order to avoid conceiving of it as just an 
exclusionistic, static, and tradition-bound system of exchange.” Other 
researchers have gone beyond this. Thus Wong Siu-lun (Siu-lun 1996, p. 22). in 
an article on Chinese entrepreneurs concludes that “since particularistic ties are 
flexible in nature, the boundary between insider and outsider is rarely clear-cut 
and the monopoly seldom absolute. Personal networks are constantly breaking 
up and being regrouped. Thus economic order has to be achieved through the 
multiple overlaps of shifting personal networks.”  
5 Hedging and buffering in post-communism 
As I have argued in the theoretical part of this chapter, economic networks do 
not have to be close, cohesive and clan-like. Informal relationships can just as 
easily be seen as utilitarian, disjointed, and case-by-case. The higher overall 
environmental uncertainty is, the higher the likelihood that economic actors 
will maintain alternative back-up channels. 
There is little to suggest that this logic has changed in the post-Soviet 
context. Overall uncertainty, if anything, had increased dramatically, 
permeating the political, legal, and economic context all at once. Heightened 
uncertainty in turn shortened the time horizons of economic and political 
actors and fostered opportunism. Needless to say, this did not promote 
cohesion and trust. Even where trust was a given, sheer economic instability 
made it unwise to rely on a tight, single-partner network without multiple 
backup systems: After all, even the most powerful patron may fall, and even 
the most trustworthy network partners may face sudden bankruptcy for a 
number of unpredictable reasons. Ups and downs also recurred in the political 
realm, and were enhanced by the traditional Soviet as well as Russian divide-
and-rule approach to cabinet politics. Actors, both political and economic, had 
to adjust their strategies to this unsettling reality. As predicted, they did this by 
resorting to both vertical integration and hedging network relations. 
5.1 Vertical integration 
As outlined in section 4, vertical integration within conglomerates and 
ministries had been an important operating principle of Soviet economic 
actors. This did not principally change under transition, although both the 
sources of uncertainty and the legal-institutional context for potential 
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integration changed dramatically. In the framework of the shortage economy, 
uncertainty had principally originated from the sphere of supply. This remained 
a concern even after 1991; however, it was augmented by new concerns and 
opportunities stemming both from the post-Soviet privatisation drive and the 
newly monetised nature of economic life (Woodruff 1999).  
Nonetheless, due mainly to privatisation, Soviet-era economic integration 
decreased rather than increased in the first years of transition. This was not due 
to lessened demand for it; rather it was caused by the legal framework of the 
privatisation process. In Soviet times,  integration had been provided both by 
branch administrative organs and in industrial conglomerates. After 1991, these 
groupings were split up. This was not because of practical considerations: in 
fact, many industry insiders had advocated a preservation of larger units 
because so many crucial management functions and knowledge operated above 
the enterprise level  (author interview with Igor’ Sankin interview, Rossiiskie 
lesopromyshlenniki, October 10, 1996). This, however, was prevented by legal 
constraints such as the 1987 enterprise law (author interview with Sergei 
Stepanov, Soiuz lesoeksporterov,  October 8, 1996). 
All the same, given the enduring nature of economic uncertainty, vertical 
integration remained attractive as an economic strategy. This is perhaps best 
visible in the fact that it soon became a guiding principle not just for Russian 
directors, but for foreign investors as well. The probably best-publicized 
example of this comes from the realm of fast food: famously, the Russian 
subsidiary of McDonalds does not buy in the open market but raises all its own 
livestock domestically on specially equipped farms. Not all investors were 
prepared for this; thus, IKEA founder Ingvar Kamprad in a broadcast 
interview voiced his dismay at the necessity to provide backup  in-house 
electricity supplies for the company’s Russian operations (Süddeutsche Zeitung, 
June 22, 2009). Donors also adopted similar strategies: thus, an EBRD venture 
capital fund in the Arkhangel’sk region centred its strategy on investment along 
the entire production chain, all the way down to include transport (author 
interview with Dall Nygard, EBRD, October 30, 1996). 
Large Russian companies likewise soon resumed their attempts to insulate 
the production chain from uncertainty by bringing as much as possible of it in-
house. Thus in examples from the forestry sector, in many Russian regions 
downstream companies attempted to secure supplies by gaining control of 
logging operations (Lesnaia Gazeta, August 3, 1995), and also integrated simple 
processing operations: The Arkhangel’sk-based Solombala Pulp and Paper 
Plant, for instance, in 1999 set up its own saw-milling operations (Economic 
News from Regions, RIA Oreanda, February 18, 2000). 
While upstream integration grew out of the industry’s traditional operating 
procedures, new strategies also emerged. First and foremost, this included 
close links with banks. Thus, the export organization “Vologodskie 
lesompromyshlenniki”, the largest exporter in the region, according to 
newspaper reports united “nine enterprises, a bank, an insurance and a leasing 
company” (Izvestiia, January 11, 2000). Exporters also have attempted to 
achieve organizational link-ups in the transport sector, in particular with 
seaports, in order to control environmental uncertainties caused by weak 
transport infrastructure. Thus the Roslesprom-owned exporter Roseksportles 
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in 1995 bought shares in several ports, as well as “of a whole series of other 
production and transport companies” (Lesnaia Gazeta, August 17, 1995). One 
year later the company even entered into a cooperative arrangement with the 
Russian customs service that revolved around opening special processing 
centers for timber shipments (Stepanov interview, October 8, 1996). 
Vertical integration was not just driven by economic uncertainty, but also 
fostered by the peculiarities of the Russian tax system. Loopholes in the 
classification of “services” actually permitted owners of raw materials to 
circumvent VAT payments on processing steps (author interview with Dall 
Nygard, EBRD, October 30, 1996). This was the case, for instance, if a sawmill 
bought forest on the stump and then hired a local contractor to do the actual 
logging. In the case of financial-industrial groups such arrangements required 
the involvement of a bank. 
While integration solved many problems for enterprises, it was no 
panacea. Real hierarchical control, in many cases, remained an elusive goal. 
This was due both to the concrete circumstances of the privatization process 
and to the vagaries of Russian corporate governance. As conceptualized in the 
network literature, the criterion for the existence of a conglomerate (as distinct 
from overlapping shareholdings and/or directorates) should be an outright 
majority of shares and hence, direct management control. However, this was 
hard to achieve in Russia. The prevailing privatization method had resulted in 
large employee shareholdings. In addition, state property funds to this day 
remain sizable minority shareholders in many enterprises. Very small 
shareholdings, on the other hand, leave minority investors powerless. As 
Russian bank analysts have argued, the crucial threshold for shareholdings lies 
at 25 percent - the minimum required to formally block decisions at 
shareholders’ meetings (New York Times, August 13, 1999). In practice, 
however, even outright majority control may not be enough to influence 
decisions. As the Kotlassk Pulp and Paper plant found to its chagrin in 1998, 
even its majority control in regional lespromkhozy could not keep their directors 
from cutting off Kotlassk in order to take advantage of higher prices offered 
by Russian competitors. In response, the plant decided to build up actual in-
house logging operations to cover 60 percent of its raw timber needs (Pravda 
Severa, November 9, 1998). 
5.2 Multiple network ties 
The ever-present possibility of defection meant that enterprises needed to 
build up reliable alternatives for future transactions. This was illustrated in the 
very beginning of this paper in a quote from the personal computer business. 
It was also true of other economic sectors. According to surveys conducted by 
the International Institute for Applied System Analysis in the late 1990s, 
regional forest sector enterprises routinely worked with at least three to five 
suppliers. Suppliers in their turn also had multiple customers (Carlsson, 
Lundgren and Olsson 1999). This was also a pattern in international trade 
links. Scandinavian timber companies, as I learned during interviews in 
Finland, avoid sourcing the maximum possible delivery from one single 
Russian supplier. As the import manager for Russia at Finnish paper giant 
UPM Kymmene explained to me, there are clear upper limits on individual 
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deliveries that serve to keep the level of risk acceptable. Typical deliveries, in 
this way, usually range between 100,000 and 150,000 m3 - “with anything 
larger, you become too dependent” (Kylmänen interview, March 16, 1999). 
Another Finnish company, Aranna Oy, was even more careful. In the late 
1990s, the company regularly worked with between 90 and 100 different 
Russian suppliers. This enabled it to flexibly switch between suppliers as 
needed – crucial in a market in which, according to a senior Aranna manager, 
only 60 percent of business went according to contract. “There are always 
surprises … The life cycle of relations is like this [waves his hand up and 
down], they come and go. The longest relationships last about five years, not 
more”. On average, Aranna’s business partners came and vanished again 
within three years, “usually then the partner there disappears or changes his 
line of business.” (Kirvesniemi interview, March 22, 1999). 
Besides mere multiplication of ties, companies also took other 
precautionary measures, such as for instance the insistence on prepayments. 
This is all the more astonishing as authors in the “clan” literature had identified 
network solidarity as a source of mutual non-payments (Kharkhordin & 
Gerber 1994, p. 1077-1079; Stark & Bruszt 1998, p. 154). However, this view 
has been clearly contradicted by other studies.  As Mark E. Shaffer (Schaffer 
1998, p. 90) argues on the basis of large-scale firm survey studies of several 
Eastern and Central European countries including Russia, “Surveys of firms in 
TEs [transition economies] present clear evidence that suppliers do not 
continue to ship to customers who have not paid for goods already received, 
that they will often demand from their customers part cash in advance or on 
delivery, and so forth…” While there were indeed outstanding payments, their 
level did not exceed that of trade credit in Western economies. “Firms in TEs, 
as in Western economies, tolerate late payment by customers and do so simply 
because they want the business. They do not tolerate nonpayment, and while 
distressed firms in TEs do tend to accumulate overdue debts to suppliers when 
they get into difficulties, suppliers do not continue to supply these firms unless 
they are actually getting paid.”  Radaev (2003, p. 13) similarly stresses the 
importance of prepayments especially with fairly new business partners. Their 
general conclusions are borne out by regional studies. As Carlsson et al. 
(1999:12) report from the Tomsk region, enterprises’ ability to pay in advance 
was “regarded as an essential prerequisite for running the trade.”  
Perhaps an even more important factor was the instability of the larger 
economic and political environment. From one day to the next, formerly loyal 
partners might cease to operate, or – as Finnish managers pointed out to me – 
succumb to the more persuasive kind of pressure exerted by Russian organized 
crime (author interview with Kirvesniemi, UPM-Kymmene, March 22, 1999).  
Paradoxically given this quote, not even Russian organised crime itself was 
immune from this lack of stability and commitment. As one of the best-
informed scholars on the subject argues (Galeotti 2000b), “(t)he Russian 
mafiya ….lacks the discipline and vertical structures of the Sicilian Mafia or 
Chinese Triads and instead comprises a collection of gangs, crews and 
individuals that operate largely autonomously, yet are linked within loose 
networks dominated, but not controlled, by senior [criminals].” “Bonding 
social capital”, in the form of ethnic ties, was no help in this conundrum: 
“many of these networks have lost the personal or regional loyalties which held 
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smaller gangs together…. With little holding them together beyond self-
interest and fear of reprisals in case of disloyalty, they are prone to division and 
redefinition, as components choose to move into another network as the 
balance of opportunities seems to shift. This helps explain the relative 
instability of the mafiya and its tendency towards internal bloodletting.” 
(Galeotti 2000a) 
Multiple networking strategies were also clearly present in the political 
realm. As the newspaper “Segodnia” reported in spring 1999, many regional 
governors were card-carrying members of two or three different political 
“parties” or coalitions at the same time. This, the paper argued, was a logical 
consequence of political instability: “In this fashion, the majority of governors 
is guided by an old principle – not to put all one’s eggs in the same basket” 
(Segodnia, April 27, 1999). 
Just as it was not unheard of for regional leaders to be associated with 
several countrywide political parties at the same time, enterprises also often 
chose to join overlapping business associations. Elsewhere (Lehmbruch 2003) 
I have described how two competing associations co-existed for an extended 
time period even though there was little functional differentiation between 
them. I had explained this with associations’ role as clientelistic brokers. Seen 
in this perspective, multiple membership was as a rational hedging strategy 
from the point of view of members: By multiplying memberships, they were 
also multiplying their chances of access to decision-makers. 
6 Conclusions 
What do the hedging patterns described above mean for both individual 
economic actors and post-communist society as a whole? On the plus side 
such practices have provided actors with considerable reserves of flexibility 
with which to respond to disruptions of the system. They have thus cushioned 
the impact of economic and political crisis and prevented further social unrest. 
 However, such positive effects have to be contrasted with at least as 
weighty negative ones. On the enterprise level, multiple brokerage does not 
reduce uncertainty, but rather manages it; environmental uncertainty may be 
contained, but since repeated searches substitute for real regularization, it is not 
lessened in any significant way. This is not to say hedging strategies do not 
work, on the contrary they are often surprisingly successful in many cases. 
However, they are cumbersome and involve tremendous losses from 
transaction costs that could be avoided under more conventional structures 
such as clans or formal organizations. On a societal level organizational 
fragmentation of the type severely impedes institution-building as well as 
governability in general. Thus, "stability" cuts in two different ways and can 
also be described as "inertia". Paradoxically, the same coping strategies that 
helped ward off total economic collapse by insulating actors from the impact 
of formal institutions also impede the construction of new institutions. As 
actors multiply their ties to central organizations, this in turn weakens 
allegiance to all such organizations and hence reduces their ability to enforce 
compliance. 
25 
While democratic governance is impeded, Oleinik (2005, p. 11) claims that 
the low-trust conditions dominating the Russian political economy are also a 
constitutive factor fostering the rise of political authoritarianism. As he argues, 
“(u)ncertainty prevails in the institutional environment with the low level of  
[instititionalised and general trust] because economic subjects appear unable to 
plan their actions in a rational way: they cannot be sure of business partners. 
There exists a pressing need for finding at least minimal assurance that 
obligations will be fulfilled. Moreover, the mutually alienated individuals are 
ready to sacrifice a very important part of their freedom in favor of anybody 
who will give them such guarantees … A mistrustful society can exist only if it 
relies on coercion as a key element of its institutional construction…” 
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